New Texts Out Now: Mazen Masri, The Dynamics of Exclusionary Constitutionalism: Israel as a Jewish and Democratic State

New Texts Out Now: Mazen Masri, The Dynamics of Exclusionary Constitutionalism: Israel as a Jewish and Democratic State

New Texts Out Now: Mazen Masri, The Dynamics of Exclusionary Constitutionalism: Israel as a Jewish and Democratic State

By : Mazen Masri

Mazen Masri, The Dynamics of Exclusionary Constitutionalism: Israel as a Jewish and Democratic State. London: Bloomsbury Professional, 2017.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book?

Mazen Masri (MM): The question of the book–Israel’s definition as a Jewish and democratic state–is one that I have been preoccupied with since I took the constitutional law course in the first year of my law degree at the Hebrew University. I was struck by how this contradiction is explained away using liberal language. The arguments and the explanations presented a picture that did not match the lived experience of many people, myself included. My interest in this question became even more significant when I was in legal practice in Jerusalem, and even more when I worked as a legal advisor on the question of Palestinian refugees. The argument that the Palestinian refugees (or even some of them) should not be allowed to return because return means that Israel will lose its Jewish majority and will no longer be a “Jewish state” was uncritically accepted by many despite its racist underlying assumptions. In many ways, the question of the meaning of the Jewish state goes beyond questions of internal constitutional law. It encapsulates and distills many legal and political dimensions of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with local, regional, and international implications.

After studying and then practicing law in the Israeli legal system and my different encounters with the “Jewish and democratic” formulation, I decided to take the time to systematically study this formulation, how it is justified and defended, and how it is used throughout the legal system. I was interested in something that goes beyond the classic argument that there is contradiction between the two terms. I wanted to explore the definition not just as a legal text, but also as an idea that is the product of the intimate relationship between law and politics: to explore the definition not just as a textual expression in basic laws, legislation, and court decisions, but also as the embodiment and representation of an ideology that informs the mind-set, policies, and practices in the laws and institutions of the state.

J:  What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address?

MM: The book explores the meaning of the “Jewish and democratic” definition focusing on two themes. The first theme is constitutional theory, more specifically, the idea of “the people.” I explore how constitutional theory (or theories) help us understand the definition and expose the weakness of the mainstream justifications. Based on constitutional theories that ground the democratic legitimacy of a constitutional order on the idea that “the people” governs itself through the exercise of popular sovereignty, this book examines Israel’s constitutional order and democracy by addressing the question “who is the people in Israel?” The people in this context is the “self” in the exercise of self-governance, which is one of the most basic ideas in democracy. I examine who is included in “the people” through the prism of the existing constitutional order. An examination of the different facets of the constitutional regime focusing on how political power is generated and exercised by the state and its organs can help identify the source of ultimate political power that exercises sovereignty and holds constituent power, and thus who “the people” is.

The second theme of the book is settler colonialism and its relationship with law. Israel is the product of the Zionist movement, and the state adopts many policies that could be described as settler colonial: where the state acts as the tool of a settler society in conflict with an indigenous population. Despite arguments to the contrary, it is clear that what happened in historic Palestine in the past hundred years fits the definition of settler colonialism. Given that settler colonialism is best understood as a structure–that is, not just a passing event but rather a founding principle or a way of ordering state and society–the logic of settler colonialism is carried on into the settler state even if it operates and manifests itself in varying ways. In the book, I focus on the relationship between settler colonialism and the law: how settler colonialism shapes the development of Israeli constitutional law, and how law, in turn, operates to give effect to the logic of settler colonialism in the form of establishing and reinforcing the settler nation and dissolving the native population. Here I rely on the work of Patrick Wolfe on settler colonialism, and I apply some insights from Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL). I mainly rely on Anthony Anghie’s work, which situates colonialism and the “civilizing mission” at the center of the development of international law. The “civilizing mission” highlights the differences between the European and the non-European peoples and casts the latter as uncivilized and backwards and justifies the use of law to bridge this gap. In the book, I identify how similar dynamics could be identified in Israeli constitutional law.

Based on these two themes, I examine certain areas of constitutional law in Israel. I start with the Declaration of Establishment of the State of Israel, and discuss its legal significance and the settler-colonial narrative it provides. I then move on to discuss the immigration and citizenship laws and policies and their role in shaping “the people.” I also highlight their significance as one of the main areas where law complements violence in the process of eliminating the native population. Here I discuss laws such as the Law of Return and the Citizenship Law and the obsession with demography. The focus then turns to the idea of political representation. Representation is important in shaping the relationship between the governors and the governed. The power of the government (the state writ large) is legitimated through representation. The discussion here focuses on Basic Law: The Knesset and other associated statutes which set recognition of the Jewish and democratic definition of the state as a condition for participation in parliamentary and local elections, and registration of political parties. Finally, I examine the constitution in action by highlighting the ways the constitution is shaped and amended, and how legislation is enacted, interpreted, and reviewed by courts, and the role that the “Jewish and democratic” definition plays in each of these areas.   

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MM: The book is relevant for a number of audiences, both academic and more generally. As a book on constitutional law it is relevant for the work of comparative constitutionalists and political scientists. In addition, the book is of interest to students of constitutional law and theory who are interested in questions of identity and constitutionalism elsewhere. Here I hope that the book will broaden the scope of the engagement with Israeli constitutional law, which has been hitherto dominated by models that highlight majority-minority relations or the “nation-state model.” This approach fails to take account of or explain historical events and many of the state policies. For example, it does not take account of the process by which the majority became a majority and the minority became a minority. Nor does it take into account the fact that the majority is comprised of recent immigrants compared to the indigenous minority. It also fails to explain many of the policies that are related to land control and expropriation, political representation, and population control. Adding the settler-colonial lens and the relationship between law and colonialism provides a better framework for understanding the evolution and shaping of the law.

Scholars of settler colonialism will find the book interesting for their work, as it explores the relationship between law and settler colonialism and how both regenerate and reinforce each other. I hope that it will enhance our understanding of how law in settler-colonial contexts plays an instrumental role is regenerating settler colonialism and gives it the liberal language and cover.

The book will also be an essential resource for academic and policy researchers, diplomats, and journalists who deal with the various aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and wish to learn more about the “Jewish and democratic” definition and its implications.

While writing the book, I tried to avoid formal legal language as much as possible, and used language that is accessible to the informed reader. While some of the technical points will inevitably require some prior knowledge of some terms and concept, the bulk of the book was written with a wide audience in mind. Readers with (slightly) above threshold knowledge of the Middle East and the Israeli-Arab conflict will find it accessible. It will be especially relevant to those engaged in political solidarity struggles.

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MM: I am currently working on a new project that continues some of the themes of this book, but broadens them to other areas. Given how closely intertwined settler colonialism and law are, I decided to study how this relationship shapes constitutional law in a comparative perspective. I am currently looking at how this relationship manifests itself in different settler-colonial state and how it still shapes the operation of public law today.

Excerpts from the introduction: 

Atir-Um Al-Heiran is a village in the Naqab (Negev) in the south of Israel. It is home to 1,000 members of the Abu Al-Qi’an Bedouin tribe. It has been so since the Israeli Military Governor ordered them to move to that area in 1957 after they were expelled from their original village in 1948/1949. Atir-Um Al-Heiran is an ‘unrecognised village’—a village that exists, where people live, but whose existence the state does not acknowledge. The village does not appear on any official map, and no road signs announce the dirt side-road that leads to it. It is not connected to the electric grid, the water supply system or a sewage system. Healthcare and education services are a bare minimum. The only official recognition the village receives is on planning maps as ‘the area designated for demolition’ to make room for what will be the town of Hiran, which is officially designated as a Jewish town to be built on the current location of Atir-Um Al-Heiran.   The rest of the area is designated for forestation. A few kilometres away stands another ‘unrecognised’ village, Al-Araqeeb, with a population of 300. In 2010, this village was destroyed, all 45 structures were demolished, and 4,500 olive trees were uprooted. The area was officially designated for forestation to be carried out by the Jewish National Fund.  The residents of the village rebuilt some tents, huts and ramshackle dwellings, which were subsequently destroyed. As of June 2016, the Ministry of Interior has demolished Al-Araqeeb 99 times.  The residents of both of these villages are Israeli citizens.

Not far away from these villages are ‘individual settlements’ or ‘single family settlements’. These large tracts of land, usually hundreds or thousands of acres, are allocated by the state to an individual or a single family for the stated purpose of the development of agriculture and tourism. In reality the main objective is to ‘protect’ state land from use by the Arab population.  These tracts have been allocated to Jewish citizens only, and are connected to the water and electricity networks despite the fact that most of them were built in breach of planning laws.  Some of the legal defects were retroactively rectified by legislation enacted in 2010.  Like the ‘unrecognised villages’, the residents of these settlements (or ranches) are also Israeli citizens.

The Israeli state acts, using law and through legal channels that include planning authorities, courts and enforcement bodies, to demolish villages and replace them with other (Jewish) towns. At the same time, the state enacts law that is used by the same planning bodies, courts and enforcement bodies to justify and legitimise the grant of vast tracts of lands to other citizens. This takes place despite numerous decisions by the Supreme Court declaring that in Israel all citizens are ostensibly equal. ‘The State of Israel’, former Chief Justice Aharon Barak stressed in the Ka’dan ruling, ‘is a Jewish state in which minorities live, including the Arab minority. Everyone who belongs to these minorities enjoys full equal rights.’  He further added that ‘equality of rights between humans in Israel, whatever their religion or national belonging is, is derived from the values of the state as a Jewish and democratic state’.  How can this stated commitment to equality be reconciled with the situations described above? How can the law and the institutions that make, adjudicate and enforce it, displace one group of people, grant favourable land rights to others, and still be seen as neutral and impartial and fulfilling the requirements of equality among citizens which is at the heart of democracy?

This quandary is only one example in the curious case of the Israeli constitutional system in which the state is defined as ‘Jewish and democratic’. The state, loyal to the ‘democratic’ part of the definition, has the main markers of democracy. It has a government that is drawn from an elected parliament, and most civil and political rights are guaranteed by basic laws and other instruments such as Israeli ‘common law’. Election results have always been respected. The legislative branch supervises the actions of the executive branch, and the judiciary has the power to review the actions of the other two branches. Equality is officially a constitutional right, as expressed in the quote by Barak. External bodies also seem to view these markers favourably. In 2015, Freedom House classified the country as ‘free’, and gave it the score of 1.5 for freedom, 2 for civil liberties, and 1—the highest score available—for political rights.  In 2010, Israel joined the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), an exclusive club of states that are, according to its convention, committed to democracy.

At the same time, the state adopts many policies that could be described as settler-colonial: where the state acts as the tool of a settler society in conflict with an indigenous population. Moreover, the definition as a Jewish state means, among other things, that the state promotes Jewish immigration, Jewish nationalism, Jewish culture and heritage, Jewish settlement, and a special role for the Jewish organisations such as the Jewish Agency and the Jewish National Fund.  The Supreme Court further asserts that this definition means that there should be a Jewish majority in Israel, and that Israel must preserve a Jewish majority so as to remain a Jewish state. Discrimination, in many cases as a matter of law and policy, can be identified in almost all aspects of life in Israel. Adalah, a human rights organisation dedicated to achieving equal individual and collective rights for Palestinians in Israel,  counts more than 50 Israeli laws that discriminate against the Palestinian citizens of Israel.  The number of statutes on this list seems to be constantly on the rise. This legal discrimination permeates the social, economic and political spheres. In almost all conceivable areas including health, education, income, employment, budget allocation, social welfare and development, Israel’s Palestinian citizens fare worse, and in some cases, much worse than the Jewish citizens.  Palestinians, who are almost 20% of the population,  are significantly underrepresented in all branches of government, the civil service and public sector,  despite legislation that mandates ‘appropriate representation’ in the civil service and legislation that protects equality in employment in general.

 

Does the fact that the state is defined as a ‘Jewish and democratic’ state have anything to do with this outcome? What does this definition mean? How is it used to justify certain features of constitutional law in Israel and the constitutional order in general? What does it say about the nature of the regime in Israel? This book seeks to tackle these questions and examine the meaning and implications of Israel’s definition by focusing on its relationship with certain aspects of the constitutional regime such as sovereignty, constituent power and the idea of the People. 

New Texts Out Now: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein, guest eds. "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis." Special Issue of Conflict, Security & Development

Conflict, Security and Development, Volume 15, No. 5 (December 2015) Special issue: "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis," Guest Editors: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you compile this volume?

Mandy Turner (MT): Both the peace process and the two-state solution are dead. Despite more than twenty years of negotiations, Israel’s occupation, colonization and repression continue–and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian people is proceeding apace.

This is not news, nor is it surprising to any keen observer of the situation. But what is surprising–and thus requires explanation – is the resilience of the Oslo framework and paradigm: both objectively and subjectively. It operates objectively as a straitjacket by trapping Palestinians in economic and security arrangements that are designed to ensure stabilization and will not to lead to sovereignty or a just and sustainable solution. And it operates subjectively as a straitjacket by shutting out discussion of alternative ways of understanding the situation and ways out of the impasse. The persistence of this framework that is focused on conflict management and stabilization, is good for Israel but bad for Palestinians.

The Oslo peace paradigm–of a track-one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution–is therefore in crisis. And yet it is entirely possible that the current situation could continue for a while longer–particularly given the endorsement and support it enjoys from the major Western donors and the “international community,” as well as the fact that there has been no attempt to develop an alternative. The immediate short-term future is therefore bleak.

Guided by these observations, this special issue sought to undertake two tasks. The first task was to analyze the perceptions underpinning the Oslo framework and paradigm as well as some of the transformations instituted by its implementation: why is it so resilient, what has it created? The second task, which follows on from the first, was then to ask: how can we reframe our understanding of what is happening, what are some potential alternatives, and who is arguing and mobilizing for them?

These questions and themes grew out of a number of conversations with early-career scholars – some based at the Kenyon Institute in East Jerusalem, and some based in the occupied Palestinian territory and elsewhere. These conversations led to two interlinked panels at the International Studies Association annual convention in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. To have two panels accepted on “conflict transformation and resistance in Palestine” at such a conventional international relations conference with (at the time unknown) early-career scholars is no mean feat. The large and engaged audience we received at these panels – with some very established names coming along (one of whom contributed to this special issue) – convinced us that this new stream of scholars and scholarship should have an outlet.  

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures do the articles address?

MT: The first half of the special issue analyzes how certain problematic assumptions shaped the Oslo framework, and how the Oslo framework in turn shaped the political, economic and territorial landscape.

Virginia Tilley’s article focuses on the paradigm of conflict resolution upon which the Oslo Accords were based, and calls for a re-evaluation of what she argues are the two interlinked central principles underpinning its worldview: internationally accepted notions of Israeli sovereignty; and the internationally accepted idea that the “conflict” is essentially one between two peoples–the “Palestinian people” and the “Jewish people”. Through her critical interrogation of these two “common sense” principles, Tilley proposes that the “conflict” be reinterpreted as an example of settler colonialism, and, as a result of this, recommends an alternative conflict resolution model based on a paradigm shift away from an ethno-nationalist division of the polity towards a civic model of the nation.

Tariq Dana unpacks another central plank of the Oslo paradigm–that of promoting economic relations between Israel and the OPT. He analyses this through the prism of “economic peace” (particularly the recent revival of theories of “capitalist peace”), whose underlying assumptions are predicated on the perceived superiority of economic approaches over political approaches to resolving conflict. Dana argues that there is a symbiosis between Israeli strategies of “economic peace” and recent Palestinian “statebuilding strategies” (referred to as Fayyadism), and that both operate as a form of pacification and control because economic cooperation leaves the colonial relationship unchallenged.

The political landscape in the OPT has been transformed by the Oslo paradigm, particularly by the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Alaa Tartir therefore analyses the basis, agenda and trajectory of the PA, particularly its post-2007 state building strategy. By focusing on the issue of local legitimacy and accountability, and based on fieldwork in two sites in the occupied West Bank (Balata and Jenin refugee camps), Tartir concludes that the main impact of the creation of the PA on ordinary people’s lives has been the strengthening of authoritarian control and the hijacking of any meaningful visions of Palestinian liberation.

The origin of the administrative division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the focus of Tareq Baconi’s article. He charts how Hamas’s initial opposition to the Oslo Accords and the PA was transformed over time, leading to its participation (and success) in the 2006 legislative elections. Baconi argues that it was the perceived demise of the peace process following the collapse of the Camp David discussions that facilitated this change. But this set Hamas on a collision course with Israel and the international community, which ultimately led to the conflict between Hamas and Fateh, and the administrative division, which continues to exist.

The special issue thereafter focuses, in the second section, on alternatives and resistance to Oslo’s transformations.

Cherine Hussein’s article charts the re-emergence of the single-state idea in opposition to the processes of separation unleashed ideologically and practically that were codified in the Oslo Accords. Analysing it as both a movement of resistance and as a political alternative to Oslo, while recognizing that it is currently largely a movement of intellectuals (particularly of diaspora Palestinians and Israelis), Hussein takes seriously its claim to be a more just and liberating alternative to the two-state solution.

My article highlights the work of a small but dedicated group of anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli activists involved in two groups: Zochrot and Boycott from Within. Both groups emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep disillusionment with the Oslo paradigm. This article unpacks the alternative – albeit marginalized – analysis, solution and route to peace proposed by these groups through the application of three concepts: hegemony, counter-hegemony and praxis. The solution, argue the activists, lies in Israel-Palestine going through a process of de-Zionization and decolonization, and the process of achieving this lies in actions in solidarity with Palestinians.

This type of solidarity action is the focus of the final article by Suzanne Morrison, who analyses the “We Divest” campaign, which is the largest divestment campaign in the US and forms part of the wider Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. Through attention to their activities and language, Morrison shows how “We Divest”, with its networked, decentralized, grassroots and horizontal structure, represents a new way of challenging Israel’s occupation and the suppression of Palestinian rights.

The two parts of the special issue are symbiotic: the critique and alternative perspectives analyzed in part two are responses to the issues and problems identified in part one.

J: How does this volume connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MT: My work focuses on the political economy of donor intervention (which falls under the rubric of “peacebuilding”) in the OPT, particularly a critique of the Oslo peace paradigm and framework. This is a product of my broader conceptual and historical interest in the sociology of intervention as a method of capitalist expansion and imperial control (as explored in “The Politics of International Intervention: the Tyranny of Peace”, co-edited with Florian Kuhn, Routledge, 2016), and how post-conflict peacebuilding and development agendas are part of this (as explored in “Whose Peace: Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding”, co-edited with Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (PalgraveMacmillan, 2008).  

My first book on Palestine (co-edited with Omar Shweiki), Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond (PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), was a collection of essays by experts in their field, of the political-economic experience of different sections of the Palestinian community. The book, however, aimed to reunite these individual experiences into one historical political-economy narrative of a people experiencing a common theme of dispossession, disenfranchisement and disarticulation. It was guided by the desire to critically assess the utility of the concept of de-development to different sectors and issues–and had a foreword by Sara Roy, the scholar who coined the term, and who was involved in the workshop from which the book emerged.

This co-edited special issue (with Cherine Hussein, who, at the time of the issue construction, was the deputy director of the Kenyon Institute) was therefore the next logical step in my research on Palestine, although my article on Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionists did constitute a slight departure from my usual focus.

J: Who do you hope will read this volume, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MT: I would imagine the main audience will be those whose research and political interests lie in Palestine Studies. It is difficult, given the structure of academic publishing – which has become ever more corporate and money grabbing – for research outputs such as this to be accessed by the general public. Only those with access to academic libraries are sure to be able to read it – and this is a travesty, in my opinion. To counteract this commodification of knowledge, we should all provide free access to our outputs through online open source websites such as academia.edu, etc. If academic research is going to have an impact beyond merely providing more material for teaching and background reading for yet more research (which is inaccessible to the general public) then this is essential. Websites such as Jadaliyya are therefore incredibly important.

Having said all that, I am under no illusions about the potential for ANY research on Israel-Palestine to contribute to changing the dynamics of the situation. However, as a collection of excellent analyses conducted by mostly early-career scholars in the field of Palestine studies, I am hopeful that their interesting and new perspectives will be read and digested. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MT: I am currently working on an edited volume provisionally entitled From the River to the Sea: Disintegration, Reintegration and Domination in Israel and Palestine. This book is the culmination of a two-year research project funded by the British Academy, which analyzed the impacts of the past twenty years of the Oslo peace framework and paradigm as processes of disintegration, reintegration and domination – and how they have created a new socio-economic and political landscape, which requires new agendas and frameworks. I am also working on a new research project with Tariq Dana at Birzeit University on capital and class in the occupied West Bank.

Excerpt from the Editor’s Note 

[Note: This issue was published in Dec. 2015]

Initially perceived to have inaugurated a new era of hope in the search for peace and justice in Palestine-Israel, the Oslo peace paradigm of a track one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution is in crisis today, if not completely at an end.

While the major Western donors and the ‘international community’ continue to publicly endorse the Oslo peace paradigm, Israeli and Palestinian political elites have both stepped away from it. The Israeli government has adopted what appears to be an outright rejection of the internationally-accepted end-goal of negotiations, i.e. the emergence of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. In March 2015, in the final days of his re-election campaign, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited the Jewish settlement of Har Homa in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which is regarded as illegal under international law. Reminding its inhabitants that it was him and his Likud government that had established the settlement in 1997 as part of the Israeli state’s vision of a unified indivisible Jerusalem, he promised to expand the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem if re-elected. And in an interview with Israeli news site, NRG, Netanyahu vowed that the prospects of a Palestinian state were non-existent as long as he remained in office. Holding on to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), he argued, was necessary to ensure Israel’s security in the context of regional instability and Islamic extremism. It is widely acknowledged that Netanyahu’s emphasis on Israel’s security—against both external and internal enemies—gave him a surprise win in an election he was widely expected to lose.

Despite attempts to backtrack under recognition that the US and European states are critical of this turn in official Israeli state policy, Netanyahu’s promise to bury the two-state solution in favour of a policy of further annexation has become the Israeli government’s official intent, and has been enthusiastically endorsed by leading ministers and key advisers.

[…]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the West Bank also appears to have rejected a key principle of the Oslo peace paradigm—that of bilateral negotiations under the supervision of the US. Despite a herculean effort by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, in response to the lack of movement towards final status issues and continued settlement expansion (amongst other issues), the Palestinian political elite have withdrawn from negotiations and resumed attempts to ‘internationalise the struggle’ by seeking membership of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), and signing international treaties such as the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court. This change of direction is part of a rethink in the PA and PLO’s strategy rooted in wider discussions and debates. The publication of a document by the Palestine Strategy Study Group (PSSG) in August 2008, the production of which involved many members of the Palestinian political elite (and whose recommendations were studiously discussed at the highest levels of the PA and PLO), showed widespread discontent with the bilateral negotiations framework and suggested ways in which Palestinians could ‘regain the initiative’.

[…]

And yet despite these changes in official Palestinian and Israeli political strategies that signal a deepening of the crisis, donors and the ‘international community’ are reluctant to accept the failure of the Oslo peace paradigm. This political myopia has meant the persistence of a framework that is increasingly divorced from the possibility of a just and sustainable peace. It is also acting as an ideological straitjacket by shutting out alternative interpretations. This special issue seeks a way out of this political and intellectual dead end. In pursuit of this, our various contributions undertake what we regard to be two key tasks: first, to critically analyse the perceptions underpinning the Oslo paradigm and the transformations instituted by its implementation; and second, to assess some alternative ways of understanding the situation rooted in new strategies of resistance that have emerged in the context of these transformations in the post-Oslo landscape.

[…]

Taken as a whole, the articles in this special issue aim to ignite conversations on the conflict that are not based within abstracted debates that centre upon the peace process itself—but that begin from within the realities and geographies of both the continually transforming land of Palestine-Israel and the voices, struggles, worldviews and imaginings of the future of the people who presently inhabit it. For it is by highlighting these transformations, and from within these points of beginning, that we believe more hopeful pathways for alternative ways forward can be collectively imagined, articulated, debated and built.